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Journalists and public policy analysts often talk about
the 'view from Washington' or the 'Washington
consensus' when referring to the current development
policies of the Bretton Woods institutions - the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund - and the
United States government. While these institutions at
times share the same views on development policies,
this is not the case with 'governance' and development.
The Bretton Woods institutions and the US
Government have in recent years taken high profile
positions on the need for better governance in
developing countries. But the logic, the politics and the
policy implications of the positions of these institutions
are different. This article will explore their differences
as well as the ethical, technical and practical issues
raised by their emphasis on governance in economic
development, with special reference to Africa, where in
the words of the World Bank, there has been a 'crisis of
governance'.
THE WORLD BANK AND GOVERNANCE
In its 1989 study, Sub-Saharan Africa. From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth, the World Bank first pointed to the
importance of governance in economic development.
The Bank's concerns about governance arose from one
major source: the failure of its structural adjustment
programmes to produce a definitive success on the
African mainland. Structural adjustment programmes
typically involve a variety of economic reforms in
monetary, fiscal, trade, regulatory policies and public
sector management. These reform programmes have
been based on the assumption that, if sufficient
economic incentives are provided to producers, they
will expand existing production and invest in new
productive activities, thus providing the engine for
sustained economic growth. What has, in fact,
happened in the most successful of Africa's adjustment
experiments - for example, in Ghana - is that, after
nearly a decade of economic reform backed by large
inflows of foreign aid, agricultural production has
expanded, exports have increased, and growth rates
have risen. But significant private investment has not
occurred. Indeed, there has been a considerable
amount of disinvestment as firms have closed down ma
more competitive environment or have been unable to
obtain adequate credit to finance their operations. The
same can be said of Nigeria where the private sector
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response to economic reforms has been insignificant.
Economic growth has been buoyed by an increased use
of existing capacities and foreign aid. Without the
anticipated growth in private investment, capacity
limitations will become constraining and growth will
remain dependent on aid flows. Why, World Bank staff
asked, has the new investment not appeared?
The answer they came up with was 'poor governance'
After some groping, the Bank settled on the following
definition of governance: 'the manner in which power
is exercised in the management of a country's economic
and social resources for development'.1 Discussions of
governance by the World Bank often include several
specific problems: lack of accountability, transparency,
and predictability on the part of politicians and
bureaucrats and the absence of the rule of law. (These
terms are often used as proxies for a less polite term -
corruption - one of the Bank's central concerns in the
area of governance, especially in Africa.) Bank staff
view these problems in particular as having discouraged
private investors from risking their capital in the
uncertain and unpredictable political environments of
Africa. Even in countries where economic reforms have
been extensive, investors remain unsure how long the
new policies will last (especially where elections are
pending), whether their property will be protected by
the law and the courts, and whether corruption which
has been so widespread will not in the end consume
their profits. As a result of these problems, it is argued,
anticipated investment has not appeared and
'governance' must improve before it does. Good
governance, in the Bank's view, has become a means to
the end of sustained economic growth in the developing
world and above all, in Africa.
While few would dissent from the proposition that
good governance is an important ingredient of
development, several difficult issues are raised by the
Bank's approach to governance. First is the definition
itself. The breadth and vagueness of the definition -,
the management of social and economic resources for
development - provides few clues for the analyst or
practitioner as to the nature of governance or the
factors affecting its quality. The Bank goes on to
describe the focus of its interest in terms that suggest it
is concerned primarily with the familiar issues of public
sector management, such as effective financial
accounting and auditing, an appropriate legal frame-
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work and open competition for public contracts.2 But
judging from the thinking of senior Bank officers and
from the Bank's activities in Africa at least, this focus
underestimates the real scope of the Bank's interest in
governance, a scope that extends by implication to
political participation, to open political debate, and to
establishment of political legitimacy.
One indication of the thinking of Bank staff regarding
governance is reflected in a recent paper by Pierre
Landell-Mills and Ismail Serageldin, in which they
suggest that good governance should include a
'minimal core of characteristics which, if not
universally accepted, are nonetheless widely agreed
upon.'3 That core included accountability, transparency,
establishment of the legitimacy of the government
through a 'well defined open process of public choice
such as elections, referendum, etc.', assurance of the
safety and security of citizens, the rule of law, freedom
of association and expression of opinions.4 Another
Bank official in the Africa Region has predicted that
research 'would underline the need to incorporate the
political dimension in current structural reform
programmes. There can be no sustainable long-term
development without social justice and political
stability.'5 Finally, the former President of the World
Bank, Barber Conable, warned the African Governors
of the World Bank at their meeting with him in 1990:
Allow me to be blunt: the political uncertainty and
arbitrariness evident in so many parts of sub-
Saharan Africa are major constraints on the region's
development . . . I am not taking a political stance
here, but I am advocating increased transparency
and accountability in government, respect for
human rights and adherence to the rule of law.
Governance is linked to economic development,
and donors are showing signs that they will no
longer support systems that are inefficient and
unresponsive to the people's basic needs.'6
The implications of these statements are, of course,
highly political. To establish transparency, governments
must provide the public with information on their
activities and the public must be able to evaluate that
information. It is hard to see how this can occur
without freedom of the media. And it is normally a very
short step from freedom of the media to freedom of
association, where citizens can meet and discuss their
views and organize to promote them. Accountability
implies that politicians can be penalized for foolish
2 The emphasis on public Sector management was even more
pronounced in the Bank's internal discussion paper on governance -
Managing Development: The Governance Dimension - written for the
Bank's Board of Directors.
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policies or corrupt behaviour. It is hard to see how
politicians can be penalized short of losing their jobs in
some form of election. It is difficult to see how the rule
of law can be preserved without an independent
judiciary. While Bank staff are careful not to identify
specific political reforms they think Africans should
adopt, and abjure simplistic solutions like 'multiparty
democracy', the policy implications of their emphasis
on transparency, accountability, the rule of law,
political participation and legitimacy are not difficult to
see.
The Bank's emphasis on governance has not only
involved general statements. The need for political
reforms has been a key element in Bank discussions
with a number of African governments. For example,
beginning in 1990, Bank officials began to press the
governments of Kenya and Malawi to adopt political
reforms aimed at seeking a 'broader political consensus'
and improving public accountability and transparency
within these countries.7 A year earlier, the Bank had
suspended disbursements of its structural adjustment
loan to strike-torn Benin, informing the government
that it could not continue its disbursements until it had
'the consent of its people' to continue its reform
programmes. (The Beninese government was broke
and faced widespread strikes and demonstrations. The
cutoff of Bank financing forced President Kerekou to
take action to reduce the political turmoil in his
country. He sought a national consensus on economic
reforms through making concessions to demands for
political liberalization. But he lost control of the
process of political change. A 'national conference' of
nearly 500 prominent Beninese met, declared itself
'sovereign', rewrote the country's constitution, elected
an interim government and set dates for national
elections. Kerekou reluctantly accepted these changes,
contested the elections and lost. The 'national
conference' was subsequently imitated in other
Francophone African countries and contributed to the
wave of political liberalization in the region which is
still underway.)
Bank staff are careful in their formal exchanges with
officials from borrowing governments not to put the
Bank out front on these essentially political issues. It is
usually possible to urge a borrowing government to
adopt political reforms by referring to the discontent of
bilateral aid donors with poor governance and warning
that, without reforms, the Bank will be unable to
encourage other aid donors to continue providing aid.
Dunstan, M. Wai, 'Governance, Economic Development and the
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with Bank staff and Africans.
Then, in the event that other donors decided to
terminate their aid, the Bank would find it difficult to
continue its own lending operations.
In the past two years the Bank has extended the scope
of its development concerns to include the political
environment in borrowing countries. Its focus on the
political environment has not been uniform everywhere.
Bank staff need two conditions to address primarily
political issues effectively: (a) the backing of major
bilateral donors, whose discontent they can cite in
raising political issues; and (b) a measure of desperation
on the part of borrowing governments for Bank credits
and Bank approbation. The latter is important if they
are to obtain aid from other sources, or debt relief.
While dissatisfaction on the part of bilateral aid donors
with poor governance in a borrowing country is
certainly important for the Bank in raising the need for
political change with the borrower, what is not known
is the extent to which the Bank, through its informal
contacts with officials from bilateral donors, has
actually raised their awareness of the problems of poor
governance in a borrowing country, as opposed to
simply acting as a messenger for those governments.
Individuals or institutions acting as brokers can often
have a major influence on the messages they transmit
and the deals they facilitate.
However, there are limits on the Bank's ability to raise
the governance issue directly with officials from
borrowing governments. Where a poorly governed
borrower has powerful foreign government patrons
unconcerned with governance or where aid represents a
small proportion of GNP and external debts are
serviceable, the Bank may have considerable difficulties
including issues of governance in its discussions. For
example, there is little evidence that the issue of
governance played a role in discussions between the
Bank and the Cote d'Ivoire over the past year, even
though the government jailed several prominent
leaders of the political opposition, and corruption, by
many accounts, remains a serious problem.
There are several problems with the extension of the
Bank's scope of interest to include governance. Some
commentators have raised the issue of 'sovereignty' -
that the Bank and other aid donors are intruding ever
more deeply into questions which have traditionally
remained the sole responsibility of individual govern-
ments. One may argue the philosophical and legal
points raised by the impact on a country's sovereignty
of international concerns about governance. But what
seems increasingly clear in the 'new world order' is that
the nature of a country's political regime will influence
Lloyd Reynolds, 'The Spread of Economic Growth to the Third
World: 1850-1 980',Journal of Economic Literature, September, 1983,
vol XXI: 976. The author ends his long essay with the following
statement: 'My hypothesis is that the single most important
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its relations with foreign governments. This is not a
new development; but, with the end of the Cold War, it
has become a far more prominent and explicit element
in international relations. The Bank's focus on
governance is thus part of a much broader trend in
which the concept of sovereignty appears rapidly to be
changing.
The issue of sovereignty may be a red herring. But
there are a number of other issues raised by the Bank's
focus on governance that pose difficult practical
problems. The first one stems from the difficult
dilemma facing the Bank as it takes on the issue of
governance. It is clear that the political environment in
a borrowing country can play a major role in shaping
the country's development and the economic
effectiveness of Bank credits. Even prominent
economists have recognized this fact8 and it is only
sensible that the institution takes it into account in its
lending decisions. If it had been able and willing to do
so in the past, it could have saved itself a great deal of
wasted credits in Africa and elsewhere. However, what
is not known and is far from clear in Bank discussions
and documents is precisely what sorts of political
problems are critical to the success of Bank lending and
which ones are not. For example, experience in Africa
and elsewhere demonstrates that absence of account-
ability and transparency do not automatically lead to
corruption and the absence of the rule of law. They may
raise the probability of corrupt practices but they do
not make them inevitable or preclude effective
government policies for economic development. South
Korean development in the past has been led by
authoritarian regimes, lacking both in transparency
and accountability to their people and not without a
measure of corruption. However, these problems of
'governance' did not impede rapid economic growth.
On the other hand, democratic government does not
ensure good governance, particularly in the economic
sphere. The government of Gambia has long been
democratic, with a free press, the right of assembly, the
right to create political parties and periodic elections. It
has also suffered from many of the same economic
problems existing in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa,
including poor economic management and extensive
corruption. We know that good governance, especially
in the economic sphere, is important to development.
We cannot be so certain of the relationship betweeen
political systems and governance or political systems
and development. Other factors, involving the quality
of political leadership, external security threats, widely
shared cultural norms, social structure, ideology, even
the size and characteristics of foreign aid, can affect the
quality of governance regardless of the nature of the
explanatory variable is political organization and the administrative
competence of government. At this point, as a properly modest
economist, I disclaim further responsibility and pass the problem to
my political science colleagues.'
regime. Reality is considerably more complex than the
Bank's approach to governance suggests and neither
Bank staff nor development specialists yet have a firm
understanding of these interrelationships.
But the other half of the Bank's dilemma prevents the
institution from being honest with itself and others
about the implications of 'governance' for its
involvement in political issues in borrowing countries
and from gaining the expertise to address those issues
effectively: the Bank cannot openly admit the degree of
its involvement in political issues without appearing to
contravene the word and spirit of its articles of
agreement which state thät 'the Bank and its officers
shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member;
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the
political character of the member or members
concerned.'9 On the issue of governance, the Bank is in
danger of acting without transparency or accountability.
The further potential problem relates to the nature of
the Bank as a multilateral development institution. It
does not have the ability to intervene in borrowing
countries to ensure that the political reforms it urges
governments to adopt do not lead to political instability
or violence. The ways to avoid such problems might
include identification of an alternative political
leadership (where the existing one is incapable of
governing well and where no organized opposition has
been permitted), resolving conflicts among groups
competing for power, strengthening political
institutions and so on. Urging governments to
liberalize politically is laudable from a human rights
point of view and may make sense from an economic
perspective. But what will be the consequences of
pressures for political liberalization on societies? What
isto stop an autocrat from provoking ethnic animosities
to prove to the Bank and others that democracy will not
work in his country? To urge political changes in
complex societies, however morally justified those
changes may be, on the basis of limited knowledge and
without the ability to ensure that the changes are
smooth and effective is a policy of power without
responsibility.
THE ¡MF AND GOVERNANCE
While the World Bank has focused on governance, the
International Monetary Fund's 'governance' issue has
been excessive military spending in developing
countries. As far as is known, the Fund has raised this
problem only in the public statements of its Managing
Director and other officials and in private discussions
with borrowing governments; it has not yet included
reducing military expenditures or downsizing the
military as a condition of its lending. (World Bank staff
have also begun raising this issue with their borrowers
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles of
Agreement, Article IV, Section 10.
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and have requested data on such expenditures as part of
their public sector expenditure reviews.) It certainly
appears to be the case that many developing country
governments spend more on their military establish-
ments than would seem justified by the security threats
facing them, either internally or externally. Political
leaders, in response to pressure from their own armed
forces for salaries, prerequisites and expensive
equipment or from foreign governments attempting to
increase their exports through arms sales, often expand
military budgets regardless of their security needs. And
expenditures on military equipment and salaries
absorb scarce monies that could be used to maintain
social services or finance investment in times of fiscal
austerity. The IMF's calling attention to this problem
is useful. But should fire eventually break out where
there is now smoke, with the Fund or Bank pressing
borrowers hard or even tying lending to a reduction in
military expenditures, there could be serious problems
for borrowing governments. Reducing military
expenditures, especially where those reductions
involved sacking military officers or reducing their
salaries, has in the past provoked coups. If reduced
military expenditure is to become a criterion for
lending in the future, either on the part of the Bank or
the Fund, it is time now to begin exploring ways of
avoiding a backlash on the part of the military when
their budgets and employment are reduced.
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ANO
GOVERNANCE
For the Bretton Woods institutions, good governance is
a means to the end of promoting economic growth. The
United States Government equates good governance
with democracy and sees it as end in itself. The US
Government has promised to link its foreign aid to the
existence of democratic regimes abroad; it is required
in law to cut off aid to regimes coming to power by
overthrowing a democratically elected government;
and it has begun to programme some of its aid to
promote democracy abroad - for example, political
party training and the financing of election observers.
Promoting democracy abroad is not a new policy for the
United States. In a number of cases in the past, the US
military imposed a democratic regime on occupied
countries, not just the Philippines, Japan and Germany
but also in a variety of countries in Central America.
Supporting democracy abroad has been a recurrent
theme in US policies since the Second World War,
though more compelling security concerns, particularly
resisting the expansion of Communist influence,
frequently overrode those policies.
The end of the Cold War has eliminated the principal
constraint on Washington's support for democracy
beyond US borders. It is no longer necessary to provide
foreign aid to corrupt but diplomatically helpful
autocrats. The US is free to extend its human rights
policies, long popular with the American public, to
political rights, linking the closeness of its relations to
foreign governments to their performance in both
areas. And this has now begun to happen, in words and
actions. US aid has been cut to Mobutu Sese Seko of
Zaire, one of the world's most corrupt leaders but one
who has long been supportive of US interests in Africa.
It has cut aid to Kenya pending political liberalization
there. Four years ago, the US would not have taken
such action, valuing access for its Air Force and Navy
to air and port facilities in Mombasa should an
emergency arise in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf.
But it is not just the end of the Cold War and the
re-emergence of values as an influence in US aid
policies that has given rise to the current emphasis in
Washington on promoting democracy abroad. It is also
a practical response to a variety of domestic political
imperatives. The most urgent imperative is finding a
rationale for a $15 billion a year foreign aid programme.
The United States began to transfer concessional
resources abroad in the late 1940s as an effort to bolster
the governments and economies of Greece and Turkey
in the face of a communist-led insurgency in the former
country and Soviet pressures for territorial concessions
from the latter country. The Marshall Plan soon
followed aid to Greece and Turkey and was also
motivated by a concern that lagging economic recovery
in Western Europe would lead to an expansion of
communist influence there. From the very beginning,
US foreign aid has rested heavily on the need to
respond to external threats to US and world security
emanating from the Soviet Union. Indeed, it seems
likely that without such threats, an insular American
public and a sceptical Congress would have never
acquiesced to a sizeable foreign aid programme in the
years following the Second World War. Security
concerns were the first and remained the principal
pillar on which the US aid programme has rested over
the past 45 years.
The second pillar is promoting development abroad.
This goal gained prominence during the l960s and,
though the definition of 'development' and under-
standings of how aid can best promote it have shifted
almost on a decade by decade basis, the goal has
remained important to the maintenance of the core
constituency of political liberals in Congress who
would support the annual passage of legislation
appropriating aid monies.
Several changes over the past decade have eroded both
of these pillars. In the early years of its aid programmes,
US security concerns and development needs could be
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found in the same countries. East Asian countries, like
Korea, and after the Cuban Revolution, Latin
American countries, were areas of priority attention in
Washington and were needy enough to justify
concessional loans and grants for development. In the
1970s, Washington's attention shifted to Indochina,
where aid could again be justified on both security and
development grounds. During the l980s, US security
concerns in the developing world focused on Central
America and the Middle East. But many of the
countries in these regions were no longer among the
world's poorest. Meanwhile, the most urgent develop-
ment needs were in sub-Saharan Africa, where US
security interests were minimal. Security and
development needs had begun to diverge.
During the mid-l970s and 1980s, another element
began to influence the size and direction of US aid
domestic political interests, above all, the pro-Israel
lobby. Although large amounts of aid to Israel could
not easily be justified on the basis of development
needs, security concerns combined with pressures on
Congress from lobbying groups ensured that a
substantial proportion of US aid was directed towards
Israel. There are many on Capitol Hill who credit the
exceptionally effective pro-Israel lobby with the
continuing increase in overall levels of US aid.
With the ending of the Cold War, the critical security
rationale for aid is now gone, and the rationale for aid to
Israelis also diminishing, as the country is no longer as
threatened by regimes in Syria and Iraq backed by the
USSR. Recent hardline policies by the Bush
administration to resist increases in aid to Israel suggest
that domestic political pressures are insufficient by
themselves to ensure large US aid flows to that country
(except during the election campaigns).
The second pillar on which US aid has rested -
promoting development abroad - is also much
weakened, for two reasons. One is that, in the area of
the developing world where aid flows from all sources
have been largest in relation to recipient economies,
sub-Saharan Africa, aid has proven ineffective in
ensuring development. The economic problems in
many parts of Africa appear to have worsened even as
the size of aid inflows have grown. It is difficult to
justify aid for development without definitive success
stories to point to. As in the case of the World Bank,
there appears to be a loss of confidence among
Washington aid officials that they can achieve their
mission, particularly in Africa.
But there is a more fundamental problem eating away
at the development foundation of US aid. With the
increasing geographic differentiation between US
security concerns and development needs abroad, there
has been a loss of interest at the most senior levels of the
US government in promoting development abroad.
This is not a phenomenon of the Bush administration
alone. It can be traced back to the Nixon administration
or before, and its manifestations include a lack of White
House involvement in development issues or in
lobbying Congress on aid, and the appointment of
political cronies rather than individuals of national
stature with an interest in development to head the
Agency for International Development (AID). Most
recently, it is reflected in the absence of any vision of
how aid can be used to promote development on the
part of administration officials. Rather, official
statements on how US development aid is to be used
have become a collection of fashionable clichés, often
lacking in substance and with little coherence. For
example, initiatives announced by AID in 1990 and
1991 have included a democracy programme, a
partnership for business and development, a programme
for family and development, an environment initiative,
an effort to promote US exports and a strategic
management programme.
What is happening here is a groping for a new set of
rationales to justify the continuation of US aid abroad
now that the security rationale is gone and the
development rationale is much eroded. The emphasis
on using aid to promote democracy is a manifestation of
this groping, one that is based on 'core values' shared
by the majority of Americans and their representatives
in Congress and intended to provide them with a reason
to support or at least acquiesce in the continuation of
aid abroad.
Other factors have contributed to the emphasis in
Washington on promoting democracy abroad. Con-
servatives in the US have complained that the
administration has been more critical of the Republic of
South Africa for the absence of full democracy there
than it has been of other African governments. Part of
the motivation of senior State Department officials in
criticizing non-democratic black African regimes and
offering aid to reward or to support democratization in
Africa has been to ensure that their criticisms of South
Africa appear balanced. The emphasis in Nicaragua
was to encourage democratic elections on the
assumption that the Sandinistas would lose, which they
did.
The issues raised by the US government's emphasis on
promoting democracy abroad are somewhat different
from those raised by the Bretton Woods institutions'
emphasis on good governance. First, the US has not yet
set clear priorities on promoting democracy versus
promoting development abroad. While there appears
to be an inclination on the part of the Congress to assign
top priority to democracy - through legislation to
prohibit aid to regimes coming to power by
overthrowing democratically elected governments -
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the administration has continued to provide aid to non-
democratic regimes, like that of Ghana, as long as they
continue to implement structural adjustment pro-
grammes. Indeed, if the administration became too
strict in its emphasis on democracy as a precondition
for aid, it might find itself with a great deal of unspent
aid monies on its hands, particularly in Africa where
semi-democracies or regimes promising future elections
are common.
A second problem for the US as well as other
governments actively advocating political liberalization
abroad is whether they are willing to take responsibility
for the consequences. Governments, in contrast to
multilateral institutions, are much better positioned to
intervene where needed to smooth democratic
transitions and help resolve conflicts between political
groups where those conflicts threaten to become
violent. But in the case of the United States, there
appears to be little inclination to take on such
responsibilities except in countries where significant
US economic or domestic political interests are
involved. At present, this excludes all of sub-Saharan
Africa, except possibly the Republic of South Africa.
A third issue in promoting democracy abroad is how to
use foreign aid effectively to accomplish this goal.
There are essentially two approaches. One involves
conditioning aid flows to political liberalization -
refusing to provide aid where authoritarian governments
resist pressures to liberalize and providing aid to
governments implementing political reforms. The
second approach is to target aid on the political forces
supporting liberalization and critical to its success, for
example, political parties, the legislature, the judiciary,
the press, and civic associations. Aid funds can provide
training, financing, and technical assistance. However,
aid for either of these purposes is a double edged sword;
it can help but it can also hurt the implementation and
consolidation of democracy. Too much aid, poorly
timed, can undermine the incentives for governments
to liberalize, particularly where internal pressures
based on economic discontent are the prime force
promoting political reform. Too much aid to finance
new institutions - for example, legislatures or political
parties - can undermine the independence of those
institutions (particularly political parties and civic
associations) and their incentives to create grass roots
support needed to sustain them and ensure their
sensitivity to those they are supposed to represent. Too
much aid can encourage newly elected politicians to
create political constituencies primarily on the basis of
patronage, buying off political opposition and stifling
national debate on policies and governance. Too much
aid as a reward for political reforms can also undermine
incentives for new governments to implement economic
reforms. How much aid is enough to promote
democratization but not so much that it is stifled
remains a very difficult issue.
CONCLUSION
A new chapter appears to have commenced in aid and
development relationships, one in which considerations
of 'governance' promise to play an important role.
Whether that role will be a constructive one, benefiting
the mass of people in the developing world through
improvements in their standard of living as well as their
political rights, or whether it will lead to confusion and
greater rather than less political turmoil, is still far from
certain. Most important is that those governments and
institutions proposing to take the lead in promoting
better governance in other countries be clear about
their goals, realistic about their capacities to achieve
those (including whether they are in fact attainable)
and accountable for their actions to their own publics
and those in the countries whose environments they are
attempting to shape. Much work remains to be done.
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